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Appraisal theories of emotion, like all good theories, are 
informed by a multiplicity of earlier perspectives. Like Darwin 
(1872) and James (1884), they assume that emotions are adap-
tive (Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth, 2007; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009), 
motivating appropriate responses to environmental challenges 
and opportunities. Like dimensional theories, dating back to 
Wundt (1874/1902), they see emotional experience as continu-
ous, with infinite variations in a multidimensional space, rather 
than as separate, independent categories or programs. And they 
see emotional experience as an ever-changing process, like a 
river, rather than a collection of separate pools, or like the 
weather, rather than like sunlamps and refrigerators. Appraisal 
theorists believe that thought and emotion are largely insepara-
ble, that emotions arise from the organism’s perceptions—its 
appraisals—of environmental changes that are relevant for its 
well being. Like constructivist theorists (Averill, 1980a; Barrett, 
2006a; Schachter & Singer, 1962; and cf. Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 2000), they believe that human beings’ appraisals of an 
event are influenced by temperament, physiology, culture, cur-
rent goals, and past life experiences, so that similar events can 
provoke different emotions in different people, or in the same 
person at different times.
What is different about appraisal theories is that they don’t 
just say that a person’s emotions are constructions of the mean-
ing of the situation and leave it at that, vague and amorphous. 
They specify the materials that go into this construction, the 
constituent elements of emotional experience. These elements 
are the appraisals: Novelty, valence, certainty, goal conducive-
ness, agency, and control are the ones most commonly pro-
posed. To say that a person feels aroused, or aroused and 
negative, and the situation and her past life define the specific 
emotional experience, is to say next to nothing about what it is 
that differentiates fear, anger, grief, and disgust—what it is 
about the situation that matters. Specifying what matters in the 
person’s perception of the situation has been a central goal of 
appraisal theory, and its most original contribution.
Old Questions
Do Appraisals Cause Emotions?
I am often asked whether I think that appraisals cause emotions: 
yes or no? My writings have been unclear on this point because 
my thoughts are unclear. The issue of causality in emotion is a 
vexing one for me, and one that I have generally tried to avoid. 
There is a fundamental ambiguity to the question because there 
are so many different definitions of “cause” and so many differ-
ent definitions of “emotion.” Most current theories of emotion, 
including appraisal theories, are multicomponential (Niedenthal, 
Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006), with appraisal a significant com-
ponent that differentiates emotions. But, as Frijda points out, an 
ingredient, no matter how essential to the emotional experience, 
is not the same thing as a cause (Frijda, 1993; Frijda & 
Zeelenberg, 2001). He also argues convincingly that what 
counts as a cause depends on one’s definition of emotion. If 
emotions are defined as categorically distinct states, the defini-
tion of cause is quite different than if emotion is defined as an 
ever-changing multidimensional process. In the latter case, 
because in any emotional state certain appraisals are more sali-
ent and available than others, appraisals can cause emotions, 
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and emotions can also cause future appraisals (Keltner, 
Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). The fact 
that something is an ingredient does not rule out its being a 
cause. Water, for example, can be the cause of a seed becoming 
a plant, but water is also an essential component of the plant.
Like most appraisal theorists, I believe that emotional expe-
riences usually, but not always, start with appraisal. This 
assumption sounds as though appraisals precede emotions, and 
therefore are in a position to cause them, but that is not what I 
think. I think that appraisal changes involve neural and physio-
logical changes and thus an appraisal change is an emotional 
change. The first appraisal leading to an emotion or a change in 
emotion is usually the perception of novelty. A person may be 
walking from here to there, with the mind in a sort of emotional 
“default mode” (Raichle & Snyder, 2007), daydreaming and 
drifting among internally generated thoughts and images, and 
then something changes and the person notices. The unfocused 
background state is replaced by focused attention. Sometimes 
the novel stimulus is easily explained and dismissed as irrele-
vant, in which case the development of emotion is aborted; 
otherwise an emotional experience begins.
The appraisal of novelty is associated with physiological 
changes, such as lowered heart rate; expressive and other motor 
changes, such as widened eyes or a turn of the head, if it is an 
external stimulus, or slight tension of the corrugator muscle (a 
frown), if it is a novel thought or memory; changes in action 
tendency, so that ongoing action is suspended and the person is 
motivated to concentrate on the new event; and a change in sub-
jective experience. The organism’s state is different, physiologi-
cally and psychologically, from what it was before. It could be 
called a state of readiness for emotion or it could be called the 
beginning of emotion (Ellsworth, 1994b; Kagan, 1991), but I 
consider it an emotional experience. Whether one considers it 
the beginning of emotion or some pre-emotional state is an arbi-
trary semantic preference, not amenable to empirical test. As 
further appraisals are made, sometimes almost simultaneously 
and sometimes in response to changes in other components, 
they are also accompanied by physiological, motor, and psycho-
logical changes, and the emotional experience changes corre-
spondingly. If the person is not just drifting along in default 
mode but is already experiencing some emotion, the appraisal 
of novelty will change the experience, sometimes only for a 
moment, sometimes more significantly, depending on the nature 
of the stimulus and the current emotion. The perception of rel-
evant novelty means a change in emotion or a change to emo-
tion, and thus can be considered a cause, even if is accompanied 
by other neural and physiological changes, and even if it is also 
a component.
The cause cannot be the external event, because that event 
can mean different things to different appraisers, a central prem-
ise of appraisal theory. Since human beings can only register a 
few elements of the blooming buzzing confusion that surrounds 
them, different people perceive different things, and a particular 
person may have an emotional reaction to an event that goes 
completely unnoticed by others. A nondescript person in a wait-
ing room or a theater lobby will be merely part of the crowd to 
most people, but the sight of him will overwhelm his long-lost 
lover who presumed him dead. Although there are some univer-
sal antecedents of emotion (Ellsworth, 1994c; Frijda, 1994), in 
general my situation is not your situation. Temperament, physi-
ology, culture, current goals, past life experiences, and the cur-
rent situation have all been suggested as causes, and a plausible 
case can be made for any of them. Then the question is whether 
these phenomena influence emotions because they influence 
appraisals. I have argued that this is so in the case of culture 
(Ellsworth, 1994a), and I think that it may be generally true, but 
I have not considered all the possible exceptions.
Very often the appraisal of valence is simultaneous, or almost 
simultaneous (Zajonc, 1980), with the appraisal of novelty, and 
the “same” stimulus may elicit responses from delight to dis-
gust. The appraisals of different people are different, but so are 
their physiological responses, their expressions, their subjective 
experiences, and their action tendencies. These are correlates of 
appraisals, and may begin simultaneously with the first 
appraisal. It is a continuous process, a recursive process, with all 
components influencing and being influenced by the other com-
ponents. This is why the question of cause is not a question 
that makes sense to me, and why I prefer the term “emotional 
experience” to the term “emotion.”
Appraisals and Basic Emotions
So novelty may often be the beginning of emotion, but even that 
single appraisal can be considered an emotional experience, 
something like simple interest, or alert awareness. With addi-
tional appraisals it may become apprehension, or annoyance, or 
amusement, or terror, but the experience is emotional before it 
corresponds to a recognized emotion label. For the theorists that 
Moors (2013) calls “subemotional parts theorists” a person can 
have a multitude of emotional experiences that do not corre-
spond to the categories proposed by any basic emotion theorists.
Appraisal theorists (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; and to some extent Frijda, 1986) introduced 
the idea of appraisals by trying to show that the emotions pro-
posed by basic emotions theorists—joy, sorrow, fear, anger, and 
so on—could be broken down into more basic elements, the 
appraisals, which could be combined and recombined in differ-
ent ways to characterize these emotions: Each of the emotions 
in basic emotion theories was associated with a distinctive com-
bination of appraisals. The basic emotions were not the funda-
mental units (Ortony & Turner, 1990). Basic emotions theories 
were the dominant psychological theories of emotion at the 
time, and it is important for any new theory to show that it can 
account for the central phenomena of previous theories. So 
demonstrating that the commonly accepted basic emotions 
could be seen as combinations of more fundamental component 
processes was probably the right first step, and a good way to 
draw attention to appraisal theory. However, it had at least two 
regrettable consequences.
First, it suggested to some critics that we were just like the 
basic emotions theorists, the only difference being that we were 
trying to describe the basic emotions in terms of their component 
appraisals (Barrett, 2006b). That of course is not true. Most 
appraisal theorists have consistently argued for a near infinite 
 at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on November 8, 2013emr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Ellsworth Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions 127
number of emotional states, of which the “basic emotions” rep-
resented only a few. These few were important, both because 
there was some consensus about them among basic emotion 
theorists and because they were common across cultures and had 
names in most languages, but almost no one believed that they 
accounted for the vast variety of emotional life. Some basic emo-
tion theorists, such as Plutchik (1980), proposed that additional 
emotions were produced by blends of the basic emotions (e.g., 
love is a blend of acceptance and joy), but this was never a very 
satisfactory proposal because the term “blend” was more a meta-
phor than a description of an actual mechanism, and the blends 
still only left us with a small, finite number of discrete emotional 
states. Appraisal theorists argue that small variations in any of 
the appraisals—a feeling of slightly less certainty or slightly 
more control, for example—change the emotional experience 
through thousands of subtle, nameless variations. One of the fun-
damental goals of most appraisal theorists was to move us 
beyond the idea of emotion as a finite set of distinct categories, 
while at the same time going beyond constructionist theories like 
that of Schachter and Singer (1962) by providing clear criteria 
for the kinds of situational interpretations that matter most in the 
differentiation of emotions. In the first major empirical study of 
appraisal theory, Craig Smith and I included 15 emotions, includ-
ing pride, hope, challenge, and frustration, that had not been 
carefully considered by any basic emotion theorist since Darwin.
Second, and more important, this initial strategy distracted 
attention from three fundamental assumptions of the appraisal 
theories of Scherer (e.g., 1984), Frijda (e.g., 1986), and Ellsworth 
(e.g., 1991): (a) Appraisals are continuous, not categorical, so 
an infinite number of combinations is possible; (b) a person can 
feel emotional even if the combination of appraisals does not 
correspond to any of the emotions in basic emotion theories, or 
to any of the emotions designated by a term in her language; 
(c) emotional experience is not a state, but a process, with 
changes in the appraisals, the bodily responses, and the action 
tendencies all providing feedback to each other and transform-
ing the emotional experience.
We specified the combinations of appraisals that correspond to 
the emotions in basic emotion theories, but we never thought 
these particular combinations accounted for all emotional experi-
ence. A person can feel emotional even if only one or two apprais-
als have been made, and even if there is no word to describe the 
feeling. This can happen in pretty simple situations, like hearing a 
faint unidentifiable noise (Darwin, 1872, Chapter 9), where the 
perceiver’s feeling might shade from interest to apprehension to 
annoyance at the interruption. It can also happen in some of the 
most significant emotional experiences in life, often, but not 
always, moments of ambivalence or powerful conflicting 
demands: you have met the only woman you could ever really 
love, but she is married; your clear duty is to punish an offender, 
but you are deeply reluctant; your beloved father is drifting 
away into the world of Alzheimer’s disease. Does Hamlet ever 
feel one of the six basic emotions? Much of literature is about 
emotions that have no clear-cut labels, and we have no trouble 
understanding them or empathizing with the characters.
I have no illusions that appraisal theories, at least in their 
current form, are going to get us to Hamlet or Lear, or even to 
Harry Potter. Beatrix Potter is more like it. The appraisal dimen-
sions so far identified can account for a great deal of emotional 
differentiation, but cultures, families, and individuals may eval-
uate the world with additional, sometimes even idiosyncratic 
appraisals, and no two situations are identical. Appraisal theo-
ries can get us to the right branch of the emotional tree, but not 
to the right twig; to the neighborhood, but not to the street 
address.
Consider the appraisal of agency. Anger is generally seen by 
appraisal theorists as involving appraisals that some other per-
son (human agent) has done you harm (negative valence). But 
people vary enormously in their readiness for anger, even when 
they have been harmed by someone else, because additional 
appraisals matter to them. The intentionality of a human agent, 
for example, might make a huge difference to some people, so 
that they would be slow to anger towards a person who was 
inconsiderate but not malicious, whereas other people might get 
angry at a dog or a baby who got in their way. Or a person or 
culture might have a competing goal, such as maintaining a self-
image as a pacifist, that makes anger and its associated action 
tendencies seem unacceptable (Briggs, 1970). It is possible that 
anger and the urge to hurt might be the initial reaction even of 
the pacifist, but appraisals and emotions are not frozen in the 
moment of the initial perception, but constantly evolve as other 
beliefs, values, and memories come to mind and as the situation 
changes. This modifiability of the initial response is one of the 
evolutionary advances of emotion over the fixed stimulus–
response sequences of other species (Ellsworth & Scherer, 
2003). The pacifist and the bully, or the person from the north-
ern or southern United States, for that matter, will respond dif-
ferently to their first mental reaction to the provocation: one 
quickly reappraising or suppressing, the other perhaps bolster-
ing it. Appraisals of self-agency and nonhuman situational 
agency can be equally complex. If I caused the problem, was it 
stupidity, pressure from my companions, or what? Where am I 
on the slippery slope between mistake and malice? Appraisals 
of nonhuman agency also allow for many possibilities: I could 
see my misfortune as caused by fate, God, evil spirits, bad luck, 
the conjunction of the stars, or even regression to the mean, and 
these variants of the situational agency appraisal will affect my 
emotional experience.
Several appraisal theorists have begun to propose finer dif-
ferentiations in the appraisal process. Ellsworth and Scherer 
(2003), for example, have pointed out that uncertainty is not a 
single, simple appraisal. There are quite a few ways in which 
one can be uncertain about a situation. One can be uncertain 
about what is actually happening; one can know what is happen-
ing but be uncertain about where it’s leading, what will happen 
next; one can be uncertain about the appropriate response; one 
can know what the appropriate response is but be uncertain 
about one’s ability to carry it out, and so on. Scherer (2013) 
similarly parses the appraisal of valence, usually thought to be 
so basic and so simple, and shows that there are many different 
ways in which an event can be seen as good or bad. We can go 
much farther than we have in refining appraisals, but I do not 
think that we will ever develop a complete set that accounts for 
all emotional experience. Still, appraisal theorists have gone 
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much farther than Schachter and Singer or other vague con-
structionist theories in specifying what it is about the perception 
of the situation that differentiates emotional experience. They 
can tell us the general nature of the emotion a person is feeling, 
which is more than other theories can do, even if they cannot 
account for the precise nuances.
New Questions
Language
So, if emotional experience is an ever-changing process, a river 
rather than a collection of separate pools, why have most theo-
rists from Aristotle to Ekman, and most ordinary people, thought 
of emotions as discrete categories? I expect that language plays 
a major role here. At least in English, we think in terms of nouns 
and categories; we classify by naming. Most of the first words 
English-speaking infants learn are nouns (Tardif, Gelman, & Xu, 
1999): This is a ball, this is a book, this is daddy. We habitually 
divide processes and continua into distinct units. The New York 
Times weather report categorizes the constantly changing atmos-
pheric conditions as clouds, fog, haze, ice, partial clouds, rain, 
rain showers, sun, snow, snow showers, thunderstorms, and 
wind, more categories than exist in most basic emotion theories, 
but still not nearly enough to capture the experience of being 
outdoors. A cloudburst is not the same as days of light, continu-
ous rain, any more than acute anguish is the same as depression. 
All cultures have labels to divide the color spectrum, which has 
no built-in divisions, into categories (Berlin & Kay, 1969). We 
have created labels for categories of intelligence (moron, cretin, 
intellectually disabled, genius), mental health (insanity, schizo-
phrenia, borderline personality disorder), legal responsibility 
(negligence, intent, purpose), and, perhaps most perniciously, 
human beings (Black, White, Brown, Yellow, Red; Gould, 1996). 
At some level, well-educated people know that these are fictions, 
arbitrary lines, but they are deeply ingrained habits of thought, 
difficult to avoid. We, and especially we Westerners, are categor-
ical and dispositional (Dweck, 2006; Ross & Nisbett, 1991).
Reliance on linguistic categories creates problems for 
researchers as well, though at this time I can think of no other 
methods that will enable us to study the subjective experience of 
complex emotions. Expressive and instrumental behavior pro-
vide only partial information, and so far we have no clear evi-
dence that the central or peripheral neural processes we can 
measure correspond exactly to the subjective experience. So we 
use lists of words designating emotion categories. We ask peo-
ple to rate how strongly they are feeling each of 2 or 6 or 10 or 
sometimes more emotions, and these ratings provide a great 
deal of useful information. But they do not necessarily reflect 
the person’s experience. If the person has made a combination 
of appraisals that does not correspond to one of the emotion 
labels we have provided, she will attempt to approximate that 
feeling in her ratings. But if she rates herself as feeling happi-
ness at 6 and fear at 3, we cannot conclude that she is feeling 
“mixed emotions”—happiness and fear. She may have an indi-
visible, coherent feeling that is not captured by any of the words 
we have provided, and she does her best to approximate it by 
using the materials at hand.
Open-ended descriptions of emotion are richer, but they also 
raise problems for researchers because what people say or write 
includes many ways of describing feelings that go beyond the 
labels that we usually use. They come up with analogies: “It was 
like finding out that there was no school today”; “it was as 
though I had cheated”; “it was like being betrayed.” They 
describe situations: “When I walked in, everyone stopped talk-
ing”; “My friend was crying uncontrollably, and I didn’t know 
what to do”; “I wasn’t paying attention and oh-my-god there was 
this tree right in front of me.” They use many words for emotions 
that are not used in scientific research: I felt stupid, appreciated, 
wild, effective, secure, attractive, insulted, ignored, undeserving 
… (Boster, D’Andrade, & Ellsworth, 2012). But when we come 
to analyze these data, typically we code them into our usual emo-
tion categories, sacrificing much of the richness and insidiously 
perpetuating the categorical point of view. Even theorists who 
completely reject the idea of basic emotions and categorical dis-
tinctions use emotion categories in their research for lack of a 
superior alternative. Klaus Scherer does, Nico Frijda does, Craig 
Smith does, Lisa Feldman Barrett does. I do.
Another reason for people’s reliance on categorical verbal labels 
may be that it is unsettling to feel emotional in a way that cannot be 
defined. With positive emotions this may not be much of a prob-
lem: the person’s attention is on enjoying the moment, without 
worrying about the exact nature of the pleasant feelings. This may 
be why there are fewer verbal terms for positive than for negative 
emotions (Averill, 1980b), and why happiness has emerged as a 
lazy catchall term for positive states. But negative emotions that 
cannot be named may provoke or increase uncertainty, which may 
in turn increase their unpleasantness (Maslach, 1979). Just as a doc-
tor’s diagnosis of one’s vague pains may create a reassuring sense 
of control, even if the diagnosis is negative, so might a clear, 
bounded label for one’s undefined emotional malaise.
Having a word for an emotional state also makes the experi-
ence of the emotion more available. The words of a language 
may act as magnets in the multidimensional universe of apprais-
als, so that a person who has some of the appraisals characteristic 
of a labeled emotion will be drawn towards the word and likely 
to use it to define the ambiguous feeling. Emotional experiences 
are involving, unstable, and often disturbing, and linguistic cat-
egories provide a conceptual clarity that helps us to interpret 
ambiguous experiences as recognizable ones, to communicate 
them to others, and to behave accordingly (cf. Scherer, 1994). Yu 
Niiya and I have studied the Japanese concept of amae, often 
regarded as culturally unique, which is used to describe both an 
interpersonal relationship and the specific cluster of emotions it 
entails, emotions related to dependence, trust, and a feeling of 
closeness—for example, a relationship in which you can ask 
someone to do a relatively large, even inappropriate, favor for 
you and expect that the person will do it without resentment. We 
have found that Americans have emotional experiences very 
much like amae (Niiya & Ellsworth, 2012; Niiya, Ellsworth, & 
Yamaguchi, 2006), although the appraisals are slightly different, 
with a little more emphasis on control and little less on intimacy, 
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but it is not an easily available category of emotion in America—
it has no label, and so is not a common, easily recognizable 
aspect of everyday life as it is in Japan.
The study of how language affects emotional experience is an 
important direction for future research—cross-cultural, develop-
mental, and possibly even historical. Like amae, there are many 
words for emotions that are culturally unique or that exist in 
some languages but not in others. Even words that are used as 
direct translations may have different associations and connota-
tions (Mesquita & Leu, 2007). And over the centuries the mean-
ings of common emotion words, including the words for “basic 
emotions,” have changed. The English word sad comes from an 
Old English word meaning sated or satisfied, evolving into a 
meaning of heaviness or weariness, and finally into its current 
meaning. The Anglo-Saxon word for sadness was ange, which 
slowly evolved into the current words anguish and anger 
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). Words once com-
mon have disappeared, and new ones are constantly emerging.
Decades ago Brent Berlin and Paul Kay carried out research 
on language and the perception of color, which, like emotion, is a 
multidimensional space divided by every language into catego-
ries (Berlin & Kay, 1969). They found that the emergence of color 
terms followed a fairly orderly progression: If a language had 
only two color terms, they were dark and light. If a language had 
three terms, the third was always red; if four, the fourth was 
always something in the yellow–green range, and so on up to six 
terms. A similar study of the language of emotion would be fasci-
nating. If a language has only two emotion words, are they “feels 
good” and “feels bad”? Are there emotion words that are univer-
sal, and do they correspond to those in the languages with fewest 
terms? Do they correspond to appraisal distinctions such as 
valence or agency? Are there languages in which nouns are not 
the main way of dividing up the world of emotions, languages in 
which processes or action tendencies play that role? Do people 
who speak languages with more emotion terms have more dif-
ferentiated emotional experiences? The answer is not a foregone 
conclusion. Berlin and Kay (1969) found that people whose lan-
guages included very few color terms could distinguish among 
colors (when asked whether they were the same or different) as 
well as people with much more differentiated emotional vocabu-
laries. It may be that immediate experiences are less constrained 
by language, and therefore more differentiated, than remembered 
or imagined experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002).
The same question could be asked developmentally. When 
children learn a new emotion word, how does it affect their emo-
tional experience? Is the order in which emotion words are 
learned more or less the same among children in the same cul-
ture? In different cultures? It is obvious from developmental 
research that language is not necessary for emotional experience. 
In most children, happiness, contentment, interest, distress, fear, 
and anger are observed before the child has any language at all, 
and certainly before the child has words to describe the feelings 
(Izard et al., 1995). Words for emotion develop fairly late com-
pared to words for animate or inanimate objects, perhaps because 
the child is perfectly capable of communicating emotions non-
verbally and doesn’t need words to do so. My older daughter 
didn’t begin to name emotion-like concepts until she was 18 
months old (“hurt”), with “like” and “cry” emerging at 19 
months, and “mad” and “yuck” at 21 months. By this time she 
already had words for rocking chair, brontosaurus, slippery, and 
over 40 different animal names, all words far more rarely used in 
spoken English than the basic emotion terms. These issues raise 
problems for constructionist theories that consider differentiated 
emotion to be a product of knowledge and experience (Barrett, 
2006a; Schachter & Singer, 1962), because emotional experi-
ence clearly precedes emotional conceptualization. Indeed how 
could it be otherwise?
Emotional Habits and Automaticity
Language and culture are not the only forces that make emotions 
and their associated appraisals accessible and automatic. 
Maturation and life experience serve the same function. 
Discussions about which appraisals are more or less automatic and 
which are more or less conscious overlook the fact that any 
appraisal or combination of appraisals can become automatic over 
time, as the type of eliciting situation becomes more familiar.
The first time a person encounters a particular situation the 
appraisal process is very different from the tenth time. Consider 
the first time someone swerved around you to take the one 
remaining parking place you were aiming for; the first time you 
saw a little snake; the first time you approached someone and 
she smirked and turned away; the first time someone flirted with 
you. Appraisals of a truly novel situation, except for the few 
biologically built-in stimuli, are slower, less certain, and more 
conscious than they will be the 30th time the situation is encoun-
tered, and the emotion less well defined. Babies, who encounter 
novel situations every day, look to their parents for information 
about what to feel (Campos, Bertenthal, & Kermoian, 1992). By 
the time a person has experienced a situation several times, and 
it is more familiar, the emotional response is more automatic, 
and the person will immediately experience the full-blown emo-
tion—anger, for example, at the person who has cut her off and 
taken her parking place—with little or no awareness of the com-
ponent appraisals (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986).
In my research, I have consistently gotten stronger, more sig-
nificant results for people’s reports of emotion than for their 
reports of appraisals, although the appraisal results are signifi-
cant. This is because I have generally studied situations that are 
familiar to the participants, or remembered situations from their 
own lives where I have asked them to think about a time when 
they felt a particular emotion. The emotion is salient and com-
plete. The appraisals are generally out of conscious awareness, 
though they can be recovered when I ask about them.
As we mature, and many more events become familiar, 
the process becomes more automatic, we are more likely to 
experience just the emotion, with less access to the component 
appraisals. In the adult, in often-repeated emotional experiences 
in which similar combinations of appraisals, physiological 
responses, motor responses, action tendencies, and subjective 
experience have occurred repeatedly, it may be that components 
other than appraisals can set the process in motion. Thus for 
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example, if stirring music elicits a bodily response like that 
associated with an emotion, it may also elicit the relevant 
appraisals and subjective experience.
This is why I mistrust the results of some neuroscience stud-
ies that require repeated presentation of the same emotional 
stimuli—pictures or situations—over and over again, some-
times dozens of times. The emotional response to the 20th pres-
entation cannot possibly be the same as the response to the first, 
and it is unclear to me what an average across these multiple 
presentations could possibly represent—certainly not the per-
son’s response to her first encounter with the stimulus, which is 
presumably the one that we are interested in.
Some simple appraisals, such as the perception of novelty 
or a bitter taste, are perhaps almost always automatic, but 
even quite complex appraisals, such as incompatibility with 
moral norms, which are wholly absent in young children, can 
become instantaneous and automatic in the adult (Bloom, 
2004).
Future Directions
Appraisal theories open a multitude of possible directions for 
future research, several of which are proposed by other con-
tributors to this special section. I would like to see research 
designed to study emotions as processes, rather than as static 
entities. First, one could look at how particular emotional epi-
sodes change over time, tracing the changing appraisals and 
their correlates. This may not require abandoning verbal meas-
ures, but it will involve supplementing them. Jeff Larson 
(Larsen & McGraw, 2011) has participants continuously turn 
two dials corresponding to different emotions as they listen to 
music, and research groups in Geneva and in Leuven have also 
begun to study emotional dynamics over time. As the measure-
ment of neural processes in the brain develops, we may soon be 
able to trace brain changes from the initial perception of a novel 
event to a behavioral response, and even beyond. Experimentally, 
we could introduce new information in the middle of an emo-
tional experience designed to change the appraisals in specific 
ways and examine the neural consequences.
Second, we could test the hypothesis that emotions 
become more automatic as eliciting situations become more 
familiar, with appraisals being slower, more hesitant, and 
more sequential when the stimulus is unfamiliar and becom-
ing faster and more coherent after repeated encounters with 
similar situations. These differences in responses to similar 
episodes across time could be studied with both brain and 
behavioral studies.
Third, and closely related, I think a major gap in our under-
standing of appraisals and emotions is the lack of research on 
the development of emotions in infancy and early childhood. 
Appraisal theories make the clear and unique prediction that 
emotional experiences are not possible for children until they 
have the capacity to make the necessary component appraisals. 
Fear and surprise should not occur, for example, until the infant 
can distinguish certainty from uncertainty, and has formed 
expectations that can be disconfirmed. Anger and distress 
should not be distinguishable until infants can attribute their 
pain to the actions of another person. There is already consider-
able evidence that emotional experiences like pride emerge 
when the baby realizes that she herself can make things happen 
(White, 1959). These emotions emerge well before the baby 
has words to describe them. Also, since so many situations 
are new to children, it may be easier to observe appraisal 
components before they have coalesced into holistic, habitual 
emotional responses.
Eventually the child does have words for talking about emo-
tions, and another very interesting avenue for research is to 
explore how language affects the development of emotional 
experience. Do children’s emotional experiences, as well as 
their perceptions of emotions in others, increasingly correspond 
to the emotion categories in their language? These studies 
would involve research on children growing up speaking differ-
ent languages, comparing languages where words for certain 
kinds of emotional experience are commonly used with lan-
guages without words for those experiences. If the earliest emo-
tion words learned by children in one culture are quite different 
from the first words of children in another culture, it would be 
interesting to look at differences in their emotional perceptions 
and experiences. If there are languages in which the common 
vocabulary emphasizes categorical nouns to describe emotions 
less than English, perhaps emphasizing appraisals or action ten-
dencies or processes more, those comparisons would be espe-
cially interesting. Finally, it would be interesting to compare 
children or cultures with more words to describe emotions to 
those with fewer, to see whether in fact the differentiation in the 
language was reflected in differentiation in experience, for 
example, in the perception of similarities and differences in 
emotional-eliciting situations or expressive behaviors.
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